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INTRODUCTION
Many states have enacted laws that serve to limit non-economic
damage awards for medical liability claims.' These laws were put into
effect in the hope of controlling medical liability insurance costs,
thereby reducing medical costs to consumers and preserving or in-
creasing access to healthcare for individuals. There exists a large body
of literature addressing the success or failure of these laws, the con-
clusions of which are somewhat contradictory.2 The efficacy of these
laws has important policy implications as the federal government
seeks to impose nationwide tort-control laws including medical liabil-
ity limits.
t Ph.D., currently at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
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See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 2006) (limiting non-economic
damages in medical liability claims to $250,000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.207(7)(b)
(West 2006) (limiting non-economic damages to $250,000).
2 See generally Heidi Li Feldman, The New Mexico Law Review Presents a
Symposium on Civil Numbers: Examining the Spectrum of Noneconomic Harm, 35
N.M. L. REV. 375 (2005) (calling the distinction between economic and non-economic
damages "senseless"); and Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose
of Pain and Suffering Awards: Turning Compensation into "Punishment", 54 S.C. L.
REV. 47 (2002) (discussing how plaintiff's attorneys can manipulate non-economic
damages to increase their client's award).
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A. Brief Description of Limits on Medical Liability Claims
Three types of damages may flow from successful medical
liability claims: (1) economic damages, (2) non-economic damages,
and (3) punitive damages. Economic damages include past and future
medical expenses, loss of past and future earnings, loss of property,
costs of repair or replacement, and loss of employment or business
opportunities.3 Economic damages are objective, verifiable, and
measurable. 4 Non-economic damages include pain, suffering,
inconvenience, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship,
loss of consortium, and loss of enjoyment of life.5 Non-economic
damages are, by definition, subjective, and often difficult to verify and
measure.6 Punitive damages are awarded to punish the defendant and
deter future malpractice.7
One of the first attempts to address the issue of medical malprac-
tice limits is California's 1975 Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act (MICRA). 8 In 1985, after numerous legal challenges, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of MICRA:
[I]n enacting MICRA the Legislature was acting in a situation
in which it had found that the rising cost of medical
malpractice insurance was posing serious problems for the
health care system in California, threatening to curtail the
availability of medical care in some parts of the state and
creating the very real possibility that many doctors would
practice without insurance, leaving patients who might be
injured by such doctors with the prospect of uncollectible
judgments. In attempting to reduce the cost of medical
malpractice insurance in MICRA, the Legislature enacted a
variety of provisions affecting doctors, insurance companies
and malpractice plaintiffs.
[The limitation on recoverable non-economic damages]
is, of course, one of the provisions which made changes in ex-
isting tort rules in an attempt to reduce the cost of medical
malpractice litigation, and thereby restrain the increase in
medical malpractice insurance premiums. It appears obvious
3 See Cong. Budget Office, Limiting Tort Liability for Medical Malpractice,
ECON. & BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF, Jan. 8, 2004, at 3.
4 See id.
5 See id
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333 (Deering 2006).
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that this section - by placing a ceiling of $250,000 on the re-
covery of noneconomic damages - is rationally related to the
objective of reducing the costs of malpractice defendants and
their insurers. 9
MICRA made four important changes to the medical liability tort
system: (1) it imposed a $250,000 cap on awards for non-economic
losses in medical malpractice lawsuits;' ° (2) it allowed defendants to
introduce evidence showing that a plaintiff had received compensation
for a portion of his or her losses;" (3) it authorized trial courts to re-
quire periodic payments for future damages, in lieu of lump sum
awards; 12 and (4) it imposed limits on the contingency fees that law-
yers can charge their clients.'
3
As medical costs have dramatically increased over the past dec-
ade, the public's interest in the medical liability tort system has
grown, and a number of scholarly studies of the system have ap-
peared. 14 There is a growing body of research that attempts to evaluate
the effects of damage limits on the cost of both medical liability insur-
ance and health care.' 5 Much of this research has focused on the effi-
cacy of caps applied to non-economic damages.' 6 Recent research has
also sought to determine the link between increases in health care
costs and access to health care insurance.' 7 As a result, legislative
bodies at both the federal and state levels are considering changes to
the tort system. 1
8
9 Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 680 (Cal. 1985) (holding
that "provisions of Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act which limit none-
conomic damages in medical malpractice cases to $250,000, and which modify tradi-
tional collateral source rule in litigation are not unconstitutional").
10 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b). California law defines non-economic losses
as "pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other
nonpecuniary damage." § 3333.2(a).
" § 3333.1.
12 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (Deering 2006).
13 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (Deering 2006).
14 See generally NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC
AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS UNDER
MICRA (2004) [hereinafter RAND Report].
'5 See generally id.
16 Id.
17 See Frank A. Sloan & Christopher J. Conover, Effects of State Reforms on
Health Insurance Coverage of Adults, 35 INQUIRY 280, 280 (1998).
18 See, e.g., Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare
(HEALTH) Act of 2004, H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. § 1 (2004) (tabled and text ap-
pended to H.R. 4279 on May 13, 2004).
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B. Recent Federal and State Legislative Efforts to Control Health
Care Costs
Proponents of non-economic damage limits believe that uncon-
strained non-economic damage awards significantly increase the cost
of, and access to, health care. This belief has prompted numerous ef-
forts to reform the medical malpractice tort system on a national level.
For example, H.R. 4280 provided for a $250,000 cap on non-
economic damages, which was pending before the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives during the 108 th Congress:
Congress finds that our current civil justice system is ad-
versely affecting patient access to health care services, better
patient care, and cost-efficient health care, in that the health
care liability system is a costly and ineffective mechanism for
resolving claims of health care liability and compensating in-
jured patients, and is a deterrent to the sharing of information
among health care professionals which impedes efforts to im-
prove patient safety and quality of care.19
In addition, a number of states, including Oregon (Ballot Measure
35, 2004, failed) and Nevada (Ballot Question 3, 2004, passed), have
recently considered medical liability reforms that were intended to
reduce the cost of, and improve access to, health care.2°
C. Summary of Findings
Widely accepted economic principles and the dominance of many
medical malpractice insurance markets by non-profit carriers, together
with the results of empirical research, indicate that caps on non-
economic damage awards are effective in reducing medical liability
insurance costs, thereby reducing health care costs. Limits on non-
economic damage awards reduce the incentive to litigate weak claims
and reduce the average size of malpractice awards (i.e., severity)-all
important determinants of medical costs. By reducing the cost of
medical services-and consequently making health insurance more
affordable-such limits increase the public's access to health care.
19 H.R. 4280 § 2.
20 See, e.g., David Steves, Oregon Measure's Malpractice Awards Cap
Sharply Divides Medical Professionals, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, OR), Oct. 3,
2004; Mark Taylor, No Clear Messages; On Ballot Initiatives, Voters Were All Over
the Map, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 29, 2004, at 30.
696 [Vol. 16:693
AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE CAPS
I. DAMAGE LIMITS REDUCE THE INCENTIVE TO
LITIGATE THE WEAKEST CLAIMS
Economic theory holds that individuals tend to act in their self-
interest, given the costs and benefits associated with the alternative
courses of action available to them.2' Empirical research has validated
the theory's applicability to many types of behavior, including the
propensity to file lawsuits. Other things being equal, a higher expected
payoff from filing a lawsuit will lead to more claims of alleged medi-
cal malpractice being pursued.
A. Expected Return from Filing a Lawsuit
Three factors determine the size of the payoff expected from fil-
ing a lawsuit: (1) the probability of obtaining a favorable outcome,
such as a verdict in the plaintiffs favor or a negotiated settlement
(Pr), (2) the size of the expected award (A), and (3) the expected cost
of litigating the claim (C). We can represent the interplay of these
factors in determining the expected payoff from filing a lawsuit (E*)
as follows:
E* = (Pr x A) - (C)
B. The Probability of Obtaining a Favorable Outcome
The likelihood that an individual plaintiff will prevail in litigation
depends primarily on the strength of his or her case, although the like-
lihood that a plaintiff will prevail may be increased by the degree to
which the jury views the plaintiff as sympathetic. A sympathetic
plaintiff with a weak case may be as successful in obtaining a favor-
able award as a less-sympathetic plaintiff with a stronger case.
C. The Size of the Expected Award
The size of the expected award is a function of two factors: (1) the
magnitude of the alleged damages suffered by the plaintiff, and (2)
any limiting or enhancing factors on the award. A limiting factor
would be a cap on non-economic damages awards. An enhancing fac-
tor would be the availability of punitive damages.
21 ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMiCS 75-78
(6th ed. 2005).
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D. The Cost of Medical Malpractice Litigation
It is costly to pursue damages claims, just as it is costly to defend
against them. In 2003, legal defense costs, including benefits paid to
third parties or their attorneys, claims handling, insurance company
administrative costs, and other expenses related to medical malprac-
tice liability, totaled approximately $27 billion nationwide. 22 This
amount represents approximately $91 per year, per person in the
United States, or $364 for a family of four. In addition to the out-of-
pocket costs associated with litigation, lawsuits require a heavy in-
vestment of the plaintiffs (and defendant's) time. The time spent on a
lawsuit cannot be spent on other activities.23
The cost of pursuing litigation has both fixed (Cf) and variable
(cv) components. The variable component is a function of the amount
potentially at stake. Other things being equal, a defendant will fight
harder to avoid paying a larger award, and a plaintiff will make a
greater effort to obtain such an award. The expected payoff formula
can be refined to take account of the fixed and variable cost compo-
nents, as follows:
E* = (Pr x A) - (Cf + cvA)
This formula shows that the decision to pursue a malpractice
claim is contingent on the probability of proving liability in court, and
on the expected size of the settlement or award.24 If the expected size
of the settlement or award is sufficiently large, even plaintiffs with a
relatively small probability of successfully proving liability will pur-
sue awards.
22 TOWERS PERRIN: TILLINGHAST, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2004 UPDATE: TRENDS
AND FINDINGS ON THE COST OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM, 2, 10 (2004),
http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast (follow "Publications" hyperlink; then fol-
low "U.S. and Canada" hyperlink).
23 In economic terms, the time and money spent bringing or defending a
lawsuit can be thought of as the opportunity cost of litigation-the value of the time
and resources that could be spent elsewhere. Opportunity costs can be measured and
expressed in dollar terms, although we do not do so here.
24 See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court:
The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUDIES 345, 356
(1983); Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical
Examination of the Litigation Process, RAND J. ECON., Summer 1991, at 199.
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E. The Propensity to Pursue Malpractice Claims
A meaningful cap25 on non-economic damages limits the expected
reward from filing a malpractice lawsuit. Accordingly, a cap (as well
as other limitations on the size ,of awards) will reduce the incidence
and cost of malpractice claims by discouraging the weakest claims,
and by encouraging out-of-court settlements. We model the effects of
having no cap, as well as caps of $250,000, $500,000 and $900,000,
on a claimant's incentive to file suit.
Consider a claim of alleged medical malpractice consisting of
$400,000 in economic damages and $600,000 in non-economic dam-
ages. Assume that meritorious claims have an 80 percent probability
of success and non-meritorious claims have a 20 percent probability
of success. Further assume that the fixed costs of litigating the claim
(Cf) amount to $100,000, and the variable costs (cv) amount to 5 per-
cent of the maximum potential award. Table 1 shows the impact of
various caps on meritorious and non-meritorious claimants.26
Table 1: Impact of Caps on "Meritorious" and "Non-
Meritorious" Claimants
Economic Non- CAP Prob. of Expected fixed cost vaiable variable Expected
Damages Economic win gross of cost of cost of Value
Damages return litigating litigating litigating(as %of ($)
award)
A B c d e-d*{a+if f g h=g*{a+if g-e+
,(c>0,min (c>0,min f+ h
(b,c),b)) (bc),b])
PANEL A: Weak Claimants
$400,000 $600,000 No cap 20% $200,000 -$100,000 5% -$50,000 $50,000
$400,000 $600,000 $250,000 20% S130,000 -$100,000 5% -$32,500 -42,500
$400,000 $600,000 $500,000 20% $180,000 -$100,000 5% -$45,000 $35,000
$400,000 $600,000 $900,000 20% $200,000 -$100,000 5% -$50,000 $50,000
PANEL B: Strong Claimants
$400,000 $600,000 No cap 80% $800,000 -$100,000 5% -$50,000 $650,000
$400,000 $600,000 $250,000 00% $520,000 -$100,000 5% -$32,500 $387,500
$400,000 $600,000 $500,000 80% $720,000 -$100,000 5% -$45,000 $575,000
$400,000 $600,000 $900,000 00% $000,000 -S100,000 5% -$50,000 $650,000
25 Not all caps on non-economic damages awards are meaningful. A high
cap, or a cap with significant exceptions, will not materially alter the plaintiff's and
defendant's assessment of the expected award's size, and therefore will not be effec-
tive in altering the economic incentives to pursue or defend medical malpractice
claims.
26 In this context, meritorious claims are assumed to have a higher probabil-
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As Panel A indicates, a cap of $250,000 discourages the weak
claimant from filing a medical malpractice suit by changing the suit's
expected payoff from positive ($50,000) to negative (-$2,500). The
cap however would not discourage the strong claimant (see Panel B).
Panel A also indicates that if caps are set at $500,000 or $900,000, the
disincentive to litigate marginal claims is eliminated. In actuality,
there would be a continuum of outcomes: as cap limits increase (i.e.,
are set at higher dollar values) additional claims become worth litigat-
ing. Panel B indicates that while a cap of $250,000 discourages weak
claimants from filing suits, the disincentive disappears when the cap is
raised to either $500,000 or $900,000.
In sum, caps on non-economic damages decrease the number of
malpractice lawsuits filed-primarily by making it less economically
attractive for individuals with the weakest claims to file suit. The
higher the cap, the less effective the disincentive for filing marginal
claims.
II. CAPS DO NOT APPEAR TO REDUCE ACCESS TO
THE COURT SYSTEM
Some opponents of caps have argued that these limitations reduce
access to the court system by preventing injured plaintiffs from hiring
attorneys, thereby discouraging them from filing lawsuits.27
A. Damage Limits Do Not Significantly Reduce the Number of
Lawsuits Filed
We have obtained data on the number of medical malpractice
lawsuits filed in California, the results of which we posit can be gen-
eralized to other states. The empirical evidence provides no support
for the hypothesis that the existence of damage caps in California has
reduced access to the court system. Figure 1 shows estimated medical
malpractice filings in California on a per-capita basis, for the period
1968-2003. As the figure makes clear, per-capita filings today are
higher than they were in the late 1960s and early 1970s, before
MICRA was enacted. While there has been a modest decline in per-
capita filings since MICRA's constitutionality was upheld in 1985,
the incidence of lawsuits has remained relatively high, and in some
years has actually exceeded the number of lawsuits (on a per capita
ity of "winning" (i.e., 80 percent).
27 See, e.g., FOUND. FOR TAXPAYER & CONSUMER RIGHTS, How INSURANCE
REFORM LOWERED DOCTORS' MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES IN CALIFORNIA: AND
How MALPRACTICE CAPS FAILED (2003), available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.
org/malpractice/rp/1008.pdf.
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basis) reported for 1985. In short, Californians continue to have access
to the court system, and attorneys continue to accept medical malprac-
tice cases, notwithstanding the cap.
It is reasonable to infer that the relatively modest reduction in fil-
ings that may have occurred during MICRA's existence involves pri-
marily the weakest claims-that is, the group of claims targeted by
MICRA. As Table 1 demonstrates, the MICRA cap on non-economic
damages discourages those with dubious claims from incurring the
costs associated with a lawsuit, without removing the economic incen-
tive for individuals with meritorious claims to hire attorneys and file
suit.
Figure 1: Estimated Per Capita Medical Malpractice
Filings in California,
1968 to 200328
0.25
MICRA passed in 1975
MICRA upheld in 1985
0.
2
0
.5 -10- - -
0.0
0.00
In sum, the available evidence indicates that the cap has not re-
duced access to the court system to any significant degree, and any
reduction that has occurred is almost certain to involve the weakest
claims.2
28 California medical malpractice filings are estimated based on 1968-2004
"Los Angeles Superior Court Filings and Disposition Comparison" prepared by Los
Angeles Superior Court Statistics Section. Population data was obtained from the
California Department of Finance's Historical State Population Estimates, with Com-
ponents of Change and Crude Rates. Cal. Dep't of Fin.: Demographic Research,
http://www.dof.ca.gov/html/Demograp/repndat.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
29 Figure 1 estimates medical malpractice claims in California per capita.
Another important perspective on the incidence of such claims can be gained by com-
paring claims with the number of physicians. In 2003 an estimated 4,632 medical
2006]
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B. Caps Do Not Significantly Reduce the Number of Claims Made
Against Physicians
We have obtained complete data from one medical malpractice
insurer showing both the number of physicians it insures and the
number of claims made by its insureds during the period 1976 through
2004.30 This data covers all fifty states, and we believe it provides a
fair representation of frequency rates for other insurance companies.
3
'
Table 2 shows the frequency rate on a state-by-state basis for the
period 1976 through 2004. During the eight years prior to the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's action in upholding MICRA (1978-1985),
claims frequency was approximately 23.4 percent. 32 For the next nine-
teen years (1986-2004), the rate decreased slightly to 22.8 percent.
This data indicates that caps in California do not have a significant
impact on the rate at which medical malpractice lawsuits are filed.
The slight decrease in claims frequency that has occurred since 1985
most likely reflects a reduction in the number of weak or marginal
claims filed.
malpractice lawsuits were filed in California, which is home to 93,171 physicians.
Thus, one suit was filed in this one year for every twenty doctors.
30 Data provided by The Doctors Co. (on file with authors). Underlying
exposures have not been adjusted to a base classification. The data does not reflect the
claims-made experience of large medical groups or medical schools.
31 Different insurers (and self-insured entities) define "claim" and count
"claim" in different ways. They include differentiating between a notice of claim, or
potential claim reported by a physician vs. an actual lawsuit filed and served upon the
physician. Some companies count claims by plaintiff, others by defendant, in other
words if a plaintiff sues four doctors and a hospital, depending on how one counts that
could be one, four or five claims. No single uniform standard for counting frequency
of claims exists and consequently we are unable to aggregate historical data from
multiple insurance firms. We therefore present data from a single large firm which
underwrites in all fifty states-The Doctors Company-as being representative.
32 We do not include 1976-1977 in our sample as we do not believe the num-
ber of insured doctors outside California to be sufficient to provide a representative
sample.
[Vol. 16:693
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Table 2: CA vs. Non-CA Frequency Rates
33
CALIFORNIA NON-CALIFORNIA
[al (b] [cl=[al/[b] [d] [c] [=f][dl/[el [g]=[c]/[fl-
Year Claims Insured Claim Claims Insured Claim Frequency
Doctors Frequency Doctors Frequency Difference
1976 40 678 5.9% 0 na 0.00% Na
1977 251 106 236.3% 0 na 0.00% Na
1978 506 2691 18.8% 1 II 9.30% 102.2%
1979 640 3575 17.9% 12 94 12.80% 39.8%
1980 783 4399 17.8% 24 240 10.00% 78.0%
1981 1,075 5000 21.5% 73 313 23.30% -7.7%
1982 1,171 5472 21.4% 112 378 29.60% -27.7%
1983 1,464 5880 24.9% 140 484 28.90% -13.8%
1984 1,561 5958 26.2% 164 653 25.10% 4.4%
1985 1,862 '5783 32.2% 204 699 29.20% 10.3%
1986 1,705 5941 28.7% 249 865 28.80% -0.3%
1987 1,744 6388 27.3% 367 1412 26.00% 5.0%
1988 1,781 6798 26.2% 624 2725 22.90% 14.4%
1989 1,487 6981 21.3% 636 3475 18.30% 16.4%
1990 1,522 7179 21.2% 633 4058 15.60% 35.9%
1991 1,591 7232 22.0% 690 4759 14.50% 51.7%
1992 1,844 6855 26.9% 877 5348 16.40% 64.0%
1993 1,736 7203 24.1% 1,077 5698 18.90% 27.5%
1994 1,798 7221 24.9% 1,141 6069 18.80% 32.4%
1995 1,653 7034 23.5% 1,202 6164 19.50% 20.5%
1996 1,668 6864 24.3% 1,219 6698 18.20% 33.5%
1997 1,590 6709 23.7% 1,060 6709 15.80% 50.01%
1998 1,473 6432 22.9% 1,188 7200 16.50% 38.8%
1999 1,313 6164 21.3% 926 6521 14.20% 50.0%
2000 1,297 6147 21.1% 927 6139 15.10% 39.7%
2001 1,287 6403 20.1% 1,121 7006 16.00% 25.6%
2002 1,403 6778 20.7% 1,378 8833 15.60% 32.7%
2003 1,471 7038 20.9% 1,455 9636 15.10% 38.4%
2004 1,161 7845 14.8% 899 9463 9.50% 55.8%
1994-2004 16,114 74,635 21.6% 12,516 80,439 15.6% 38.8%
1978-1985 9,062 38,758 23.4% 730 2,873 25.4% -8.0%
1986-2004 29,524 129,213 22.8% 17,669 108,777 16.2% 40.7%
33 Data provided by The Doctors Co. (on file with authors). Underlying
exposures have not been adjusted to a base classification. The data does not reflect the
claims-made experience of large medical groups or medical schools.
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As Table 2 also shows, notwithstanding MICRA, claim frequency
remains significantly higher in California than in the other forty-nine
states (some of which have caps). During the period 1986-2004, fre-
quency rates in California exceeded non-California rates, on average,
by 40.7 percent. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports that
frequency rates average approximately 15 percent nationwide.34
III. STATES WITH CAPS EXHIBIT SMALLER
AVERAGE PER-CLAIM MALPRACTICE PAYMENTS
More than half of all states have enacted caps to restrain the rate
of growth in health care costs and to preserve access to affordable
health care. 35 Not all these caps, however, are equally affective. Some
states, such as Hawaii, have adopted caps, but provide for exceptions
that make it relatively easy to circumvent the cap.36 Other states have
set caps on non-economic damages at a relatively high level, thereby
weakening or eliminating the disincentive to pursue non-meritorious
claims.37 Nevertheless, states with caps tend to report smaller average
per-claim payments.
Table 3 shows average payments per malpractice claim, by state,
for 2004.38 Note that heavily populated, industrialized states without
caps (e.g., New York - 44 th and Illinois - 5Wt ) ranked on average
much lower (i.e., higher per-claim payments) than comparable states
34 Cong. Budget Office, Limiting Tort Liability for Medical Malpractice
(2004).
35 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.010 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
102.5 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766,118 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7
(2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a0l (2006);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-
108 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (2006); MICH. COM. LAWS
§ 600.1483 (2006); Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6
(West 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (2003); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 74.301 (Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-147.1 (2006).
36 HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7.
37 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2006) (capping total damage at
$1.5 million); IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3 (2006) (capping total damage at $1.25 mil-
lion).
38 Data was obtained through the Nat'l Practitioner Data Bank [hereinafter
NPDB], and is current through March 2004 (data on file with authors). The reader
should note that the NPDB's rules require the reporting only of doctors named in final
malpractice settlements, so a payment does not have to be reported when a doctor's
name is removed from the claim. Consequently, the NPDB is missing information on
some malpractice payments. It is not clear what effect the missing data might have.
See, e.g., Joseph T. Hallinan, Doctor Is Out: Attempt to Track Malpractice Cases Is
Often Thwarted, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2004, at Al.
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with caps. Overall, states with caps held the four lowest spots (Michi-
gan, Louisiana, California and Utah) and six of the eight lowest (Kan-
sas and South Dakota).
Table 3: 2004 Average Payment Per Malpractice Claim
(Ranked From Lowest to Highest)39
40 Average Average
State Payment Rank CAP State Payment Rank CAP
Michigan $124,747
Louisiana $129,941
California $132,696
Utah $133,917
Wyoming $140,850
Nebraska $178,311
Kansas $181,550
South
Dakota $191,738
Kentucky $191,852
Washington $196,295
Nevada $198,175
Tennessee $199,456
Texas $205,812
New
Mexico $206,309
Vermont $210,341
Alabama $216,200
Alaska $217,397
West
Virginia $218,233
South
Carolina $218,884
Florida $221,293
Colorado $222,083
Virginia $234,371
I Yes
2 Yes
3 Yes
4 Yes
5
6
7 Yes
8 Yes
9
10
11 Yes
12
13 Yes
14 Yes
15
16
17 Yes
18 Yes
19
20 Yes
21 Yes
22 Yes
Missouri $256,790 27 Yes
North Dakota $257,478 28 Yes
Mississippi $261,163 29 Yes
Ohio $273,675 30 Yes
Indiana $277,769 31 Yes
Georgia $278,575 32
Oklahoma $280,888 33 Yes
Montana $291,000 34 Yes
Arizona $304,307 35
New Jersey $312,665 36
Idaho $320,130 37 Yes
Maryland $320,347 38 Yes
Maine $320,637 39
Minnesota $328,401 40
Pennsylvania $329,689 41
Rhode Island $329,994 42
Connecticut $338,238 43
New York $360,754 44
North
Carolina $364,729 45
Massachu-
setts $368,260 46 Yes
Iowa $386,197 47
District of
Columbia $388,125 48
39 Data was obtained through NPDB and is current through March 2004.(data
on file with authors).
40 Includes District of Columbia. Data for American Samoa, Puerto Rico,
Virgin Island, Armed Forces Europe, Northern Marianas, Guam, and Armed Forces
Pacific not reported.
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Table 3: 2004 Average Payment Per Malpractice Claim
(Ranked From Lowest to Highest) (Con't)
Average Average
State Payment Rank CAP State Payment Rank CAP
Arkansas $239,962 23 Hawaii $393,589 49 Yes
Wisconsin $242,131 24 Yes Illinois $455,420 50
Oregon $248,685 25 Delaware $655,767 51
New
Hampshire $253,016 26
In 2004, states with caps (Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin) averaged $234,136 per claim payment,
with an average ranking of 21. In contrast, states without caps aver-
aged $295,910 per payment, with an average ranking of 30-a signifi-
cant difference.
IV. IMPLEMENTING CAPS IN STATES WHERE NONE
CURRENTLY EXIST, CAN REDUCE PAID LOSSES BY
AS MUCH AS 30 PERCENT
Having no cap in place essentially enables a relatively small num-
ber of plaintiffs to secure very large awards, thereby increasing the
size of the average claim paid. For a specific sample of malpractice
claims, RAND has measured payments under a system with and with-
out caps. 41 They show that removing the cap (but leaving the fee lim-
its in place; in effect measuring just the effect of the cap) would raise
recoveries by 43.75 percent.42 Conversely, this implies a 30.43 percent
reduction in claim payments should caps be imposed where none pre-
viously existed. Applying this percentage to total loss payments in
2004 (as reported by the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB)) for
all states that currently have caps, indicates that removing the cap
would have increased loss payments by approximately $206 million.43
Conversely, imposing caps on the states which currently do not have
them would have reduced loss payments in 2004 by approximately
41 See RAND Report, supra note 14, at 11.
42 See id. at 38.
43 See infra Table 4. This calculation assumes that the sample is representa-
tive of the larger NPDB population. For additional details on the RAND sample, see
RAND Report, supra note 14, at 14-15. According to RAND, there is evidence that
smaller-value awards may be underreported in their sample. Id. at 13.
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$251 million.44 This reduction in loss payments would have been re-
flected in reduced medical liability insurance premiums and, eventu-
ally, in reduced consumer costs.
Table 4: NPDB Reported Paid Losses, and Effect of
Eliminating Caps on States that Have Them, and Effect of
Imposing Caps on States that Do Not Have Them
States with Caps
Alaska
California
Colorado
Florida
Hawaii
Idaho
Indiana
Kansas
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Total
Increase 43.75%
Change
2006]
2004
1,661,500
57,330,050
12,103,750
81,343,750
7,130,250
3,007,250
32,090,250
5,973,500
8,838,250
23,546,000
24,225,750
29,703,000
4,024,800
14,673,750
3,697,500
8,414,500
3,496,250
2,170,750
46,192,500
8,651,250
3,240,000
64,034,550
4,078,250
10,738,750
5,396,000
6,036,750
471,798,900
678,210,919
206,412,019
States without Caps
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Connecticut
DC
Delaware
Georgia
Illinois
Iowa
Kentucky
Maine
Minnesota
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Vermont
Washington
Wyoming
$
$
$
44 See infra Table 4.
Total $ 825,977,500
Reduce 30.43% 574,593,043
Change $ (251,384,457)
2004
3,112,500
22,414,000
3,135,000
22,666,500
9,070,000
5,724,000
35,946,000
72,305,250
4,547,550
10,985,500
4,250,000
9,815,000
3,655,500
4,042,000
67,858,250
189,875,750
42,087,250
10,115,750
273,515,500
895,000
12,600,250
8,495,750
355,000
8,138,200
372,000
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The changes shown in Table 4 only reflect the direct costs of the
medical malpractice tort system. They do not reflect the costs of de-
fensive medicine and other indirect costs that vary with limitations on
awards. Table 4 also does not reflect the costs resulting from the addi-
tional claims that would have been filed in the absence of the cap.45
V. CAPS REDUCE MEDICAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
PREMIUMS BY AS MUCH AS 43 PERCENT
Medical liability insurance premiums, like all insurance premi-
ums, are primarily determined by the insurer's cost of providing in-
surance and paying claims. Over time, increases in these costs must be
passed along to policyholders in the form of higher insurance premi-
ums. The evidence shows that by reducing the cost of the medical
malpractice tort system, caps significantly reduce malpractice insur-
ance premiums.
A. States with Caps Benefit from Lower Medical Liability Premiums
In addition to observing the correlation between loss costs and
premiums, we compare medical liability insurance premiums in states
with and without caps. Not surprisingly, insurance premiums in states
without caps are significantly higher. Figure 2 shows medical liability
insurance premiums for the five states with the largest share of the
insurance market. 46
45 See supra Table 1.
46 Data represents manual rates for specific mature claims-made specialties
with limits of $1 million/$3 million. Rates reported should not be interpreted as the
actual premiums an individual physician pays for coverage. They do not reflect cred-
its, debits, dividends or other factors that may reduce or increase premiums. These
five states represent almost 40 percent of the physician liability insurance market.
Data shown represents the highest rate (by county and provider) in each state. For
comparison, average rates for internal medicine (across all counties and providers) are
$12,017 and $41,999 for California and Florida respectively; a difference of 250
percent.
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Figure 2: 2004 Liability Insurance Premiums, by State and
Specialty
47
1nt-,,la Med1ii G-nra I-gm Obsttrc
a Caifornia B New Yok 3 Texas Illinois 13 Florida
As Figure 2 shows, medical liability premiums are significantly
lower in California than in the other four states, each of which (until
recently) lacked strong liability reforms.48 For example, in Florida,
internists pay approximately $49,000 (242 percent) more per year than
their counterparts in California; General Surgeons pay approximately
$209,000 (308 percent) more per year; and Obstetricians pay ap-
proximately $187,000 (208 percent) more per year. This comparison
provides strong evidence that limits on non-economic damages hold
down medical liability insurance premiums.
B. Legislative Changes in the State of Oregon-Where Limits Were
Imposed and Subsequently Removed-Provide Strong Evidence of
Non-Economic Damage Limits' Efficacy
In 1987, the Oregon legislature passed medical liability reforms
that imposed a cap of $500,000 on non-economic damages.49 Twelve
47 Sarah Dore, 2004 Rate Survey Indicates Rate Increases May Be Leveling
but Triple-Digit Hikes Not Over, MED. LIABILITY MONITOR, Oct. 2004, at 2.
48 The Texas Legislature adopted a cap in 2003. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. §
74.302 (Vernon 2003).
49 The Oregon legislature has established a $500,000 cap on damages for
non-economic loss in bodily injury and death cases, OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560 (2006).
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years later, in 1999, the Oregon Supreme Court removed the cap.
Figure 3 shows the premiums paid by internal medicine specialists
both before, during, and after the cap was in effect.
Figure 3: Impact of Non-Economic Damages Caps on Medical
Liability Insurance Premiums in Oregon
51
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In 1999, the inflation-adjusted average premium for internal
medicine was $4,808. By 2004, the premium had risen to $12,247, an
increase of 155 percent.
C. Limits on Non-Economic Damages Imposed at the Federal Level
Would Cause Medical Malpractice Premiums to Fall by 25-30
Percent
Several studies have attempted to estimate the effect of removing
or implementing a cap on non-economic damages. One study finds
that premiums in states that cap awards are approximately 17 percent
lower than they are in states that have no cap.52 These results suggest
50 Oregon Supreme Court ruled it to be unconstitutional under most circum-
stances. It held that the damage cap violates the right to a jury trial provided by the
state constitution whenever the cap is applied to a claim for which, under common
law, a jury trial was customary in 1857. Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 987 P.2d 463
(Or. 1999).51 Data provided by Nw. Physician Mut. Ins. Co. (on file with authors).
52 Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice 'Crisis': Recent Trends and
the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan. 21, 2004, at W4-20, avail-
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that removing caps in states that have them would cause an increase in
medical liability premiums ranging from 15 to 30 percent.53 The CBO
estimates that if caps (and other reforms) were imposed at the federal
level, medical malpractice premiums ultimately would average 25-30
percent less than under current law.54 These estimates indicate that
removal of a cap from a state that already has one would bring about
an increase in medical liability insurance premiums of 33 percent to
43 percent.
VI. CAPS DO NOT GENERATE EXCESS PROFITS FOR
INSURERS OR PHYSICIANS
Some opponents of caps contend that the reduction in loss pay-
ments resulting from caps do not produce savings for consumers.
They argue that the benefits have gone to medical liability insurance
underwriters or physicians, enabling them to make supra-competitive
profits. We can find no reliable evidence to support this argument.
A. Medical Liability Insurance Companies Face Strong Market
Competition
Economic theory holds that in competitive markets, prices must
be high enough to enable firms to cover their costs and earn a com-
petitive rate of return. 6 If market conditions temporarily allow firms
to earn returns exceeding their costs (including the cost of capital),
new firms will enter the market or existing firms will expand, driving
down prices and eliminating any excess profits. Similarly, if competi-
tion pushes prices below the point where firms are able to earn a rea-
sonable return on their capital, some firms will leave the market, caus-
ing prices to rise. Thus, the competitive process tends to force prices
to the level where firms are able to cover their costs and earn a com-
petitive return, but not an excessive return.
Medical liability insurance companies are not exempt from the
competitive forces that keep prices and profits in check elsewhere in
the economy. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that competition
within the insurance industry is vigorous. As the U.S. General
able at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.20v1.
53 id.
54 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 5: HELP EFFICIENT,
ACCESSIBLE, LOW-COST, TIMELY HEALTHCARE (HEALTH) ACT OF 2003 4 (2003) (as
ordered reported by the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on March 5, 2003).
55 "Supra-competitive profits" are defined here as profits superior to those
that would exist under a state of unregulated or unhindered competition.
56 PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 21, at 261-97.
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Accounting Office (GAO) found, "competition among insurers can
put downward pressure on premium rates, even to the point at which
the rates may, in hindsight, become inadequate to keep an insurer
solvent.,
57
B. Physician-Owned Medical Liability Insurance Companies Have
No Incentive to Retain Excess Profits
Many physician medical liability insurance companies are physi-
cian-owned, nonprofit mutual insurance companies (e.g., Medical
Insurance Exchange of California, NORCAL Mutual Insurance Com-
pany, and The Doctors Company58). As mutually-owned companies,
these insurers retain some of their earnings in order to increase the
company's capital base and protect its long-term solvency from un-
foreseen future risks. When they enjoy strong profit years, these com-
panies distribute dividends to their shareholders or premium rebates to
their policyholders.
Because physicians are both the shareholders and the customers of
these mutual insurance companies, the companies have a built-in in-
centive to return the savings resulting from caps to physicians. 9
Therefore, even if these companies had the market power to raise
premiums above competitive levels, they would have no incentive to
do so.
C. Medical Liability Insurers in States That Have Non-Economic
Damage Limits Do Not Make Excessive Profits
One way to determine if caps enable medical liability insurers to
earn supra-competitive profits is to examine the companies' return on
equity. Again, California serves as a good testing base from which to
examine this issue.
Table 5 shows that, as measured by return on equity, medical li-
ability insurers in California, where a cap is in effect, are not earning
excess profits. During the 1990-2003 period, annual nominal returns
ranged from -13.6 percent to + 13.5 percent, with an average return of
+3.16 percent. By comparison, the risk-free return (e.g., the constant
maturity return on one year U.S. Treasury Bonds) during this same
57 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO-03-702, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED
PREMIUM RATES 35 (2003).
58 Some carriers, such as CAP-MPT, are required by law to operate at a
break-even level. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1280.7 (Deering 2006).
59 The competitive market ensures that the savings passed on to physicians
are in turn passed on to consumers.
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period averaged +4.75 percent. In other words, between 1990 and
2003, medical liability insurance companies earned less than the risk-
free rate (i.e., negative risk-adjusted returns). Thus, medical liability
providers are not only failing to earn excess profits; in an economic
sense they are not earning profits at all.
Table 5: Return on Equity for California Medical Liability
Insurance Providers
60
Return on Con-
stant maturity
Total Shareholder Net Income after Return on one year U.S.
Year Equity rebates and tax equity T-Bond
1990 $ 258,675,160 $ 14,042,355 5.43% 7.89%
1991 $ 294,281,331 $ 22,453,900 7.63% 5.86%
1992 $ 329,931,078 $ 23,305,219 7.06% 3.89%
1993 $ 355,890,808 $ 19,715,366 5.54% 3.43%
1994 $ 388,624,908 $ 52,597,994 13.53% 5.32%
1995 $ 456,368,809 $ 35,283,277 7.73% 5.94%
1996 $ 489,534,893 $ 16,282,051 3.33% 5.52%
1997 $ 811,915,697 $ 69,822,289 8.60% 5.63%
1998 $ 851,928,288 $ 66,324,728 7.79% 5.05%
1999 $ 841,356,537 $ 55,348,931 6.58% 5.08%
2000 $ 839,121,338 $ 52,342,106 6.24% 6.11%
2001 $ 777,665,995 $ (74,585,008) -9.59% 3.49%
2002 $ 742,336,385 $(100,801,838) -13.58% 2.00%
2003 $ 729,665,066 $ (87,656,969) -12.01% 1.24%
Medical liability insurance companies whose first state of busi-
ness is California (i.e., the majority of their revenue is generated in
California) typically exhibit financial performance that is similar to
firms doing most of their business in other states. In cases where sig-
nificant differences do exist, California companies appear to under-
perform their peers in other states.
Table 6 shows the average net income, average policyholder's
surplus, average loss reserves, and average net underwriting income
for companies whose primary line of business is medical liability in-
surance. Data is grouped by state and represents equally weighted
averages. 61 States that do not have an insurance company with medi-
60 Figures are in the aggregate from data provided by the following compa-
nies: Coop. of Am. Physicians/Mut. Prot. Trust (CAP/MPT); Med. Ins. Exch. of Cal.
(MIEC); NORCAL Mut. Ins. Co.; Am. Healthcare Indem. Co.; SCPIE Indem. Co.;
and The Doctor's Co. (all data on file with authors).
61 Equally weighted average means the relative sizes of the companies within
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cal malpractice as its primary line of business and that generates most
of its revenues in that state are not included in the table. This selection
process allows us to present operating results that primarily reflect the
unique operating conditions prevailing in each state.
Table 6: Medical Liability Insurance Firms' 2003 Average
Net Income, Policyholder's Surplus, Loss Reserves, and
Underwriting Income
62
Average of Average of Average of
Net Rank Policyholders' Rank Loss Rank Average of Net Rank
63 Income Max= Surplus Max =  Reserves Max
=  Underwriting Max=
State ($000) 30 ($000) 30 (%) 30 Income ($000) 30
AZ $1,739 9 $127,250 8 69% 13 ($13,067) 18
64
CA ($5,170) 27 $119,572 9 64% 18 ($18,561) 22
CO ($274) 22 $84,608 14 44% 28 ($4,564) 7
CT $345 19 $67,689 17 87% 2 ($14,993) 20
DC ($4,900) 26 $70,372 16 64% 16 ($13,899) 19
FL $1,021 15 $75,532 15 62% 22 ($7,685) 12
GA $52 20 $177,177 4 64% 17 ($25,744) 25
IA ($332) 23 $14,286 27 12% 30 ($860) 4
IL $2,537 8 $172,211 5 76% 9 ($58,746) 28
LA $2,588 6 $62,120 18 75% 10 ($4,896) 10
MA $13,229 2 $230,000 3 78% 6 ($63,658) 29
MD $1,258 14 $113,427 11 68% 14 ($25,478) 24
ME ($6,364) 29 $48,407 21 63% 20 ($9,094) 14
MI $9,615 3 $170,915 6 76% 7 ($12,077) 17
MN $4,273 4 $118,158 10 80% 4 ($8,206) 13
MO ($2,159) 25 $29,145 26 61% 25 ($2,805) 6
MS $999 16 $60,244 19 83% 3 ($10,617) 16
NC $2,553 7 $35,084 24 63% 21 $462 1
each state is not factored into the calculation of mean.
62 A.M. BEST Co., BEST'S KEY RATING GUIDE, LIFE-HEALTH, (88th ed. 2004).
Data represents all insurance companies where medical malpractice was listed as the
first line of business (i.e., majority of business generated from medical malpractice
insurance). Total states represented equals thirty.
6 State indicates first state of business (i.e., majority of revenue generated in
indicated state).
64 Includes data provided by the following companies: Everest Indem. Ins.
Co, Claremont Liab. Ins. Co., Am. Healthcare Indem. Co., SCPIE Cos., SCPIE In-
dem. Co., Doctors Co. Ins. Group, Dentist's Ins. Co., MIEC Group, Med. Ins. Exch.
of Cal., Doctors Co. Interins. Exch., Cal. Healthcare Ins., RRG; NORCAL Group,
NORCAL Mut. Ins. Co., Prof'I Underwriting Liab, Health Providers Ins. Recip.
RRG, Podiatry Ins. Co, Am. Mut. Co, MedAm. Mut. RRG Inc., Underwriter for
Professions, NCMIC Group, and NCMIC Ins. Co. (all data on file with authors).
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Table 6: Medical Liability Insurance Firms' 2003 Average
Net Income, Policyholder's Surplus, Loss Reserves, and
Underwriting Income (Con 't)
Average of Average of Average of
Net Rank Policyholders' Rank Loss Rank Average of Net Rank
Income Max= Surplus Max= Reserves Max= Underwriting Max=
State ($000) 30 ($000) 30 (%) 30 Income ($000) 30
NJ ($2,051) 24 $45,952 22 48% 27 ($15,767) 21
NY ($89,150) 30 $266,391 2 80% 5 ($153,829) 30
OH ($6,208) 28 $145,653 7 72% 12 ($25,833) 26
OR $834 17 $9,756 30 61% 24 $133 2
PA $1,738 10 $106,716 12 88% 1 ($19,290) 23
TN $1,738 10 $85,442 13 60% 26 ($9,461) 15
TX $19,154 1 $357,760 1 74% 11 ($26,660) 27
UT $1,457 13 $36,428 23 76% 8 ($4,715) 9
VA $665 18 $10,284 28 61% 23 ($983) 5
WA $2,909 5 $30,442 25 63% 19 ($4,675) 8
Wl $1,587 12 $54,048 20 67% 15 ($5,819) 11
WV ($42) 21 $10,202 29 34% 29 ($71) 3
Mean ($1,545) $97,842 66% ($18,715)
Max $19,154 $357,760 88% $462
Min ($89,150) $9,756 12% ($153,829)
As Table 6 indicates, the performance of medical liability insur-
ance companies operating in California, as measured by net income
and net underwriting income, is significantly below-average. Califor-
nia companies rank 27 and 22, respectively, out of 30 states for which
data is available. This comparison provides additional evidence that
California insurance companies are not earning supra-competitive
profits, and, in fact, are relatively less profitable than their counter-
parts in other states. As measured by average net income, California
medical liability insurance companies rank 27 th out of 30 states, best-
ing only New York, Ohio and Maine-none of which have caps.
In summary, medical liability insurance companies writing poli-
cies in California are not charging, and do not have either the incen-
tive or ability to charge, excessively high premiums. Nor are these
companies earning excessive rates of return. Even if California's mal-
practice doctor-owned insurance companies were inclined to seek
excess profits, the unity of ownership and customer base would thwart
or render harmless such efforts. Thus, both economic analysis and
empirical research support the conclusion that the savings from re-
duced liability insurance premiums are passed through to consumers.
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VII. POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM A FEDERAL CAP
The decrease in medical liability costs resulting from a cap on
non-economic damages generates significant savings for states' health
care systems, both directly and indirectly. Initially, the additional sav-
ings accrue to health care providers, but because the health care sys-
tem is both interconnected and highly competitive, savings generated
in one segment of the system are eventually transmitted to the remain-
ing segments. Thus, when health care providers pay less for malprac-
tice insurance, these savings are ultimately passed along to the pay-
ers--employers providing health insurance, workers, consumers and
taxpayers as shown in Figure 4.65
Figure 4: Who Benefits from the Implementation of Caps?
AND ARE PASSED ON
SAVINGS FROM: ACCRUE TO:
TO:
Medical liability insurers Insured providers
Decreased loss costs Government programs
Self-insured providers Healthcare insurers
Uninsured consumers
Healthcare insurers
Lower medical liability
Insured providers Uninsured consumers
insurance premiums
Government programs
Employers
Healthcare insurers
Decreased cost of defen- Insured consumers
sive medicine Uninsured consumers
Government programs Taxpayers
Decreased health insur- Employers Workers
ance premiums Insured consumers
Decreased cost of gov- Federal, state & county
Taxpayers
eminent programs agencies
65 The GAO found that "hospitals and physicians incur and pass on to con-
sumers additional expenses that directly or indirectly relate to medical liability.
Therefore, estimates of malpractice premiums-taken by themselves-understate the
total effect of medical liability costs on national health care expenditures." U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO/AIMD-95-169, MEDICAL LIABILITY: IMPACT ON
HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN COSTS EXTENDS BEYOND INSURANCE 1 (1995).
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A. A Federal Cap Leading to a Decrease in the Cost of Health Care
Insurance Would Increase Health Insurance Coverage
A fundamental tenet of economics is that, for most goods and ser-
vices, a decrease in price causes an increase in the quantity demanded.
Consequently, we can be certain that decreases in health insurance
premiums resulting from the implementation of caps lead to a de-
crease in the number of individuals electing to go without coverage.
B. A Federal Cap Leading to a Decrease in the Cost of Providing
Health Insurance Will Cause Some Businesses to Increase Coverage
of Their Employees
Empirical evidence shows that employers continually evaluate
whether to offer health insurance coverage to their employees, even
when the economy is robust. 66 Research published by the U.S. De-
partment of Labor has shown that a decrease in the cost of premiums
increases the likelihood that a firm will offer health insurance.67
C. A Federal Cap Leading to a Decrease in Health Insurance Costs
Will Increase Participation in Health Insurance Programs, Particularly
by Low-Income Workers
If employees are charged less for health insurance, more will
choose to buy coverage. A growing body of research tests the sensitiv-
ity of employee behavior to health insurance costs. 68 Studies have
shown that health insurance price elasticity ranges from minus 0.1 to
minus 0.4.69 These findings can be interpreted to mean that a 10 per-
cent decrease in the price of health insurance will lead to a 1-4 per-
cent increase in the number of people who choose to purchase health
66 Arleen Leibowitz & Michael Chernow, The Firm's Demand for Health
Insurance, in HEALTH BENEFITS & THE WORKFORCE 80 (U.S. Dep't of Labor, Pension
& Welfare Benefits Admin. ed., 1992).
67 id,
68 See, e.g., M. Susan Marquis & Stephen H. Long, Worker Demand for
Health Insurance in the Non-Group Market, 14 J. HEALTH ECON. 47 (1995) (discuss-
ing the tendencies of workers not covered by employment-based insurance to pur-
chase insurance); JOHN SHELLS ET AL., THE LEWIN GROUP, HEALTH INSURANCE AND
TAXES: THE IMPACT OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY A 15 (1999)
(discussing health insurance premiums and how federal legislation will affect them);
JEANNE S. RINGEL ET AL., RAND NAT'L DEF. RES. INST., THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
FOR HEALTH CARE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE
MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM (2002).
69 RINGEL ET AL., supra note 68, at 21 tbl.3. 1.
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insurance.70 These numbers can be substantial when measured against
the total population of the United States (or more specifically in states
that currently do not have caps).
D. A Federal Cap Will Allow Physicians to Establish Practices in
States Where Liability Costs Are Currently Too Severe
Physician supply in any location and in any specialty depends, in
part, on physicians' expected income. If one state has higher medical
liability insurance costs than other states, and providers are temporar-
ily unsuccessful in passing along the additional costs to consumers,
the expected incomes of providers in that state will fall. Over time, the
income disparity will reduce the number of physicians that choose to
work in the state with higher malpractice costs. 71 New York provides
a compelling example of this problem:
The cost of medical malpractice insurance in New York City,
Westchester County and on Long Island has risen by nearly
150 percent since 1999, creating severe financial strains that
have limited patients' access to such specialties as obstetrics
and gynecology and made New York a "crisis state" for doc-
tors, according to a report released yesterday by a hospital
72trade group.
E. A Federal Cap Will Enable More Physicians to Set Up Their
Practices in Low-Income Rural or Inner-City Areas
While lower medical liability premiums as a result of a federal
cap would affect all health care providers, physicians in rural and in-
ner-city areas would benefit the most because their ability to pass on
costs is more limited than their suburban counterparts. According to
the GAO:
Actions taken by health care providers in response to rising
malpractice premiums have contributed to reduced access to
specific services on a localized basis in the five states re-
70 See, e.g., Marquis & Long, supra note 68; SHEILS ET AL., supra note 68;
RINGEL ET AL., supra note 68.
71 Cf Mark A. Satterthwaite, Competition and Equilibrium as a Driving
Force in the Health Services Sector, in MANAGING THE SERVICE ECONOMY:
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 239 (Robert P. Inman ed., 1985) (concluding that physi-
cians will work where their profits can be maximized).
72 Thomas J. Lueck, Malpractice Costs Up 150% Since 1999, Hospitals Say,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 2005, at B2.
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viewed with reported problems. We confirmed instances
where physician actions in response to malpractice pressures
have resulted in decreased access to services affecting emer-
gency surgery and newborn deliveries in scattered, often rural73
areas ....
Many rural and inner-city areas are medically under-served be-
cause these communities have higher costs in relation to revenues than
do other communities. To the extent that physicians are unable to pass
along the cost of malpractice premiums to lower-income families, a
federal cap on non-economic damages awards would help alleviate
the procider shortage in rural and inner city areas.
F. A Federal Cap Will Encourage Physicians to Enter High-Risk
Specialties
High malpractice premiums translate into higher costs for physi-
cians, especially for those specializing in obstetrics and other high-
risk specialties. Medical liability premiums are disproportionately
high among obstetricians and family practitioners who deliver ba-
bies.74 These high premiums and correspondingly higher costs dis-
courage physicians and medical students from specializing in obstet-
rics or other high-risk specialties, a fact borne out by recent press
reports:
Medical malpractice is having a profoundly detrimental effect
on health care in the United States. Women are having diffi-
culty obtaining obstetrical care, trauma surgery is difficult to
obtain in some areas, and physicians in many states are find-
ing the rising cost and availability of professional liability in-
surance an impediment to continuing their practices. 7
5
Mothers-to-be may have to go elsewhere to deliver their
babies after July 1 because physicians here say they can no
longer afford the skyrocketing cost of malpractice insurance
premiums. Dr. Steve Toadvine stopped working in the obstet-
rics unit at Knox County Hospital last year because of the es-
73 U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, Publ'n No. GAO-03-836, Medical Malpractice:
Implications of Rising Premiums on Access to Health Care 12 (2003) (examining
Florida Nevada, Pennsylvania, Mississippi and West Virginia).
74 See Stephen A. Norton, The Malpractice Premium Costs of Obstetrics, 34
INQUIRY 62 (1997) (finding that obstetrics considerably raised medical malpractice).
costs). 75 Barry M. Manuel, Fix Our Malpractice System Now, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
1, 2003, at A15.
2006]
HEALTH M4TRIX
calating premiums. Four of his colleagues plan to follow suit
in less than two months. The hospital would be the second in
eastern Kentucky at which physicians stopped delivering ba-
bies this year because of the escalating costs of malpractice
insurance. Our Lady of Bellefonte Hospital in Russell closed
its obstetrics unit in January. 'We did not anticipate making
this decision,' said Dr. Steve Sartori, one of a group of nine
physicians who deliver babies in Barbourville and Corbin.
'This was driven by a rate increase on our liability insurance
contract.'
76
Obstetrical services, such as prenatal care, are among the most
cost-effective forms of preventive medical care available. Any im-
provement in infant health outcomes provides benefits during the in-
dividual's entire lifetime. Obstetricians, however, have a significant
exposure to malpractice lawsuits, as is indicated by the relatively high
level of their malpractice insurance premiums. Table 7 shows the
premiums paid by practitioners in Los Angeles, Dade County (Mi-
ami), Long Island, and Wayne County (Detroit).
Table 7: 2004 Malpractice Premiums by Specialty
77
Los Los Dade Long Wayne
Angeles, Angeles County, Island, County,
Specialty CA Rank FL NY MI
Allergy $7,632 1 $33,460 $6,511 $18,016
Psychiatry (Non-Shock) $7,632 1 $33,460 $6,511 $19,410
Pathology $11,988 3 $83,651 $15,682 $24,607
Anesthesiology $13,808 4 $71,700 $22,650 $45,567
Family Practice (Non-Surgical) $13,808 4 $62,140 $16,130 $40,430
Internal Medicine (Non-
Invasive) $13,808 4 $83,651 $28,635 $37,346
Radiology (Non-Invasive) $15,704 7 $131,451 $35,494 $51,891
Cardiology (Invasive) $17,616 8 $131,451 $28,635 $78,958
Pediatrics (Non-Surgical) $17,616 8 $47,800 $16,130 $35,764
Ophthalmology $21,888 10 $69,310 $21,916 $40,440
Urology $21,888 10 $83,651 $38,663 $63,096
Dermatology (Lipo/Cosmetic) $24,272 12 $83,651 $22,122 $26,974
76 Roger Alford, Malpractice Crisis Stops Births at Another Eastern Ken-
tucky Hospital, Assoc. PRESS, May 23, 2003
7 Comparison reflects mature annual premium costs for $1 million maxi-
mum per case/$3 million maximum for all cases in a given year. Data was provided
by the following companies: SCPIE Indem. Co. (Los Angeles, CA); Fla. Physicians
Ins. Co. (Dade County, FL); Prof'l Liab. Mut. Ins. Co. (Long Island, NY) (policy year
ending June 30, 2004); Am. Physicians Assurance (Wayne County, MI).
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Table 7: 2004 Malpractice Premiums by Specialty (Con't)
Los Los Dade Long Wayne
Angeles, Angeles County, Island, County,
Specialty CA Rank FL NY Mi
Emergency Medicine $33,772 13 $131,451 $34,257 $92,826
Otolaryngology (Cosmetic) $33,772 13 $83,651 $68,448 $86,897
Proctology $33,772 13 $95,601 $38,663 $36,148
General Surgery $40,436 16 $277,242 $70,677 $144,188
Thoracic Surgery $40,436 16 $239,002 $68,448 $165,839
Cardiovascular Surgery $46,128 18 $239,002 $68,448 $191,965
Orthopaedics $46,128 18 $215,101 $87,866 $173,476
Plastic Surgery $58,492 20 $131,451 $68,448 $97,561
OB/GYN $66,100 21 $277,242 $117,956 $164,934
Neurosurgery $74,660 22 $344,162 $193,502 $226,545
Average - All Specialties $30,062 na $134,058 $48,900 $84,676
The differences in malpractice premiums are particularly striking
when viewed in terms of the number of procedures that must be per-
formed to fund the premiums. Physicians in Los Angeles are reim-
bursed $4,763 by Medicaid for vaginal delivery, antepartum, and
postpartum care (2004).78 Given the $66,100 premium charged
OB/GYN specialists, these practitioners must, ignoring all other costs,
perform approximately 13.88 deliveries simply to cover the malprac-
tice premium. In Florida, where the reimbursement is $4,545, the phy-
sician must perform approximately 61 deliveries to cover the
$277,242 premium.
Parents whose infants have imperfect birth outcomes are
relatively likely to file a malpractice lawsuit, and juries are highly
sympathetic to claims involving infants. High malpractice insurance
premiums can serve as a powerful deterrent to obstetrical practice,
particularly in areas where reimbursement rates are low. These areas
typically include rural areas with lower patient density, as well as low-
income areas where many patients do not have health insurance and
births are more likely to have medical complications. Consequently,
the implementation of caps and attending reduction in liability
premiums for high-risk and general practitioners would promote
increased access to health care.
78 Including Obstetrical care 1; Obstetrical care 2; Obstetrical care 3; Ante-
partum manipulation; Deliver placenta; Antepartum care only; Antepartum care only
2; and Care after delivery.
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G. A Federal Cap Will Allow Physicians to Provide Treatments that
Carry Relatively High Risks
When a provider agrees to perform a high-risk procedure on a pa-
tient, the provider's exposure to a medical liability lawsuit increases
sharply. High-risk procedures, by definition, often result in poor out-
comes. Consequently, a provider can minimize his or her exposure to
litigation by refusing to perform such procedures. In some cases,
however, high-risk procedures may be the patient's best--or only-
hope.
CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the effects of limits on medical malpractice
awards, and the consequent effects on insurance premiums, health
care costs, and access to health care. We find that caps on medical
malpractice damage awards unambiguously improve access to health
care and reduce medical expense costs across all levels of the health
care system.
Figure 5 summarizes the effects described in sections II-VII of
this Article. It illustrates how the different elements of the medical
health system are interrelated and interdependent. One can easily see
how decreased costs at one end, as a result of the implementation of
caps, result in decreased costs throughout the system.
Figure 5: Effects of Implementing Caps on Non-Economic
Damages
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